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On May 31, 2005, the Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision overturned the conviction
of accounting firm Arthur Andersen (“Andersen”) on the charge of “corruptly
persuad[ing]”1 persons to withhold documents from an official proceeding. The Supreme
Court’s decision in this case is “a bit like being acquitted years after the guillotine.”2 The
firm had largely been destroyed by the defection of many large publicly held clients
before the conviction. Many of the firm’s 88,000 employees, most of whom never dealt
with the Enron account, were at other jobs or on the unemployment rolls by the time the
conviction was handed down. As one former Andersen employee noted in an interview,
“It was the indictment that killed Andersen, not the conviction.”3 The overruling of the
conviction is not going to bring Andersen back.
In this case, the indictment alone was a death sentence; the partnership was
largely destroyed before it had an opportunity to present evidence in court or, for that
matter, before the government had to prove its case. While many clients remained loyal
as the Enron/Andersen story broke, the biggest clients, the publicly held corporations, felt
they could no longer stay with an impugned Andersen following the Department of
Justice’s indictment. Thus, a Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule along
with the agency’s and the Justice Department’s unwillingness to compromise in this
particular case trumped the tenet of innocent until proven guilty.
The Andersen case has been and will continue to be analyzed by many
commentators for years to come. Many have analyzed the situation within Andersen that
led to the erosion of its public trust and its declining standards.4 Others have analyzed in
depth why the firm should be found guilty.5 Still others have looked how the Andersen
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case and the subsequent Sarbanes-Oxley Act affect document retention and destruction
policies.6 The Andersen case has also been analyzed for its construction of the federal
witness tampering statute.7
The aim of this article is to examine the impact an indictment can have against a
limited liability partnership of professionals for the actions of a few in the court of public
opinion, and the power of the government to destroy a large, well-known business with
many employees who had no connection to the crime or the Enron account.8 The
overturning of the conviction, in this case, is not an exoneration and the firm could have
been retried and found guilty. On November 25, 2005, the Friday after Thanksgiving,
the Justice Department quietly announced in a press release that it would abandon its
prosecution of Andersen.9
The article begins with a brief chronological description of the factual background
of the case. It then examines the weight an indictment is supposed to have, followed by
the standards for issuing an indictment against an entire partnership rather than just the
individuals who allegedly performed wrongful acts. The notion of prosecutorial
discretion is heavily emphasized, and the factors that contributed to the prosecution of
Andersen are discussed. Finally, the implications of this situation are discussed in detail,
as they extend beyond Enron and Andersen and are not limited by the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. While the particulars of this case suggest questionable
motivations on the part of many of the participants, the intent of this article is to show the
considerable power government prosecutors may exert over certain business
organizations, even absent such motives. In short, the United States government has the
power to destroy a partnership, such as an accounting or law firm, without the burden of
trial or having to provide evidence of crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Case Background
By now, the background of the Andersen case is familiar to many. Andersen
served as the “independent auditor” for Enron, a global energy markets trader. At one
time, Enron was the seventh largest company in the United States.10 Andersen earned
fees from the Enron account averaging about $1 million dollars per week.11 Andersen
had already run afoul of the SEC rules on several occasions, including involvement in
fraud cases at Waste Management and Sunbeam, and settling for $217 million a case
involving the Baptist Foundation of Arizona.12 Andersen was also the auditor for Global
Crossing and WorldCom,13 both of which followed Enron as heavily publicized corporate
fraud cases at the early turn of the century.
The nation was still reeling from the attacks of September 11th when on October
16, 2001, Enron in a press release announced a $618 million net loss for the third quarter.
It also announced it would reduce shareholder equity by $1.2 billion. The value of Enron
stock, already on the decline, quickly tumbled. The next day, the SEC informed Enron of
its formal inquiry into the case. Enron, in turn, informed its Andersen audit team two
days later. On October 20, a conference call among Andersen partners concluded that the
auditors should gather documentation related to Enron to assist the SEC investigation.14
Allegedly, on October 23, Andersen began destroying documents in Houston, per
the lead Enron partner David Duncan’s insistence in following the firm’s document
retention policy. Andersen received a subpoena for Enron-related documents on
November 8. Duncan, through his secretary, sent an email on November 9 urging
employees to stop shredding.15 Andersen reported the document destruction to the SEC
and the Justice Department on January 4, 2002.
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What followed was a flurry of legal and public relations maneuvering. According
to Kurt Eichenwald in the New York Times, prior to the indictment, the SEC wanted to
settle with Andersen for $500 million. Andersen refused, largely because of a number of
class-action lawsuits filed in the wake of Enron, leaving the firm potentially liable for
another $750 million or more. Andersen reportedly was interested in settling for at least
$150 million less.16
The firm also tried to sway the public to rally to its cause. Full-page ads appeared
in the Wall Street Journal and other major papers, urging that Enron and a few rogue
employees, not the entire firm, were to blame. The firm hired former Federal Reserve
chairman Paul Volcker to recommend changes to the firm and to help in negotiations
with the federal government. Andersen employees rallied in the streets, wearing bright
orange T-shirts that read “I Am Arthur Andersen.”
Despite the public relations appeals and legal negotiations, Andersen was indicted
on March 14, 2002 on a single count of obstructing justice.17 The Justice Department
used the indictment hoping Andersen would settle quickly.18 Andersen, however, was
concerned that pleading guilty would cause state authorities across the country to remove
its licenses. Instead, Andersen proceeded to trial, pushing to get the case through as
quickly as possible to try to exonerate itself.19
Andersen was tried in the Southern District of Texas on one count of violating 18
U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B):
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in
misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to ... cause or
induce any person to ... withhold testimony, or withhold a record,
document, or other object, from an official proceeding [or] alter, destroy,
mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or
availability for use in an official proceeding ... shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
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(emphasis added). The jury deliberated for seven days, coming back deadlocked. Judge
Harmon issued an Allen charge, in which the jury returns for further instructions, and the
judge informs them of their duty to decide the case, and that they should listen to each
other's arguments with a disposition to be convinced.20 Three days later, the jury
returned a guilty verdict. The court denied Andersen's motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Andersen appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding the jury instructions proper.21
At issue in the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court appeals was what the statute
meant to "knowingly ... corruptly persuad[e]" someone. The government argued that
“knowingly” did not modify the phrase “corruptly persuades,” thus negating the intent
requirement. The prosecution convinced Judge Harmon to issue instructions to the jury
that “dishonesty” was not required to find Andersen guilty, but rather that the firm merely
impeded the prosecutor's fact-finding.22 In other words, under the government’s
argument, no intent to obstruct was necessary; the facts that documents were shredded
and that the absence of the documents would impede the prosecutor were sufficient for a
guilty verdict.
The Supreme Court held these instructions improper. Following United States v.
Aguilar23, the Court held that the statute required a “nexus” between the obstruction and a
proceeding. In other words, the defendant must know that his actions are likely to affect
the proceeding. Because the jury instructions failed to properly define this nexus
requirement, the conviction was overturned.
The conviction itself and the subsequent appeals were meaningless with regard to
the firm's survival. As an Andersen spokesman stated after the Supreme Court decision,
“we pursued an appeal of this case not because we believe Arthur Andersen could be
restored to its previous position but because we had an obligation to set the record
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straight and to clear the good name of the 28,000 innocent people who lost their jobs at
the time of the indictment.” 24 As this statement indicates, the indictment itself was the
death of the firm. As with the instructions issued to the jury in its trial, the government
did not have to establish guilt to wipe out one of the largest accounting firms in the
nation. It issued the indictment, and that was enough.
The Legal Standard for an Indictment and its Authority
An indictment is “the formal written accusation of a crime, made by a grand jury
and presented to a court for prosecution against the accused person.”25 An indictment, in
other words, is simply an indication by a grand jury that there is sufficient evidence to go
forward with a trial. The standard for an indictment is considerably lower than that for a
conviction. While the standard for a criminal conviction is guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, 26 the standard for a grand jury to return an indictment is that the person charged is
probably guilty27 or that there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty.28
Significantly, grand jury proceedings are not governed by the rules of evidence.29
Thus, for example, it is possible to issue an indictment on the basis of hearsay which
would not be admissible during the trial.30 In Costello v. United States, for example, the
defendant was indicted for income tax evasion. He filed a motion to examine the minutes
of the grand jury and found that the indictment was entirely based on the testimony of
three government agents who had no firsthand knowledge of the transactions in question.
The Supreme Court said that the Constitution required grand juries for the issuance of
indictments. However, the Constitution made no mention of how grand juries should
proceed. Historically, grand juries were made up of laypersons and grand juries
historically could even act upon their own personal knowledge. Thus, to force the rules
of evidence upon grand jury proceedings, the Court held, “would run counter to the
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whole history of the grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries
unfettered by technical rules."31
Further, indictments cannot be challenged because they are not supported by the
adequate evidence.32 Courts usually will not review the sufficiency of the evidence
before the grand jury.33 This is especially true if there is at least some34 legal and
competent35 evidence in support of the indictment was before the grand jury. Such
evidence need not necessarily involve every element of the criminal charge. Instead,
there must be some evidence relative to the charge.36 In fact, a single witness's testimony
before a grand jury can be sufficient for an indictment.37
Thus, an indictment is not meant to have the force of a conviction. In turn, it is
much easier for prosecutors to obtain. In the United States, our criminal law is premised
on the fundamental notion of the defendant being innocent until proven guilty.38 While
an indictment does have some force and may be an indication of guilt, it is not a
conviction and is not meant to have the same impact. An indictment confirms neither
guilt nor innocence. It is simply the first step in a complex legal process.
Factors That Led to the Death of Andersen
Charging a Partnership with Criminal Activity for the Actions of a Few
Like a corporation, a partnership can be held criminally liable for the actions of its
agents. The Supreme Court determined this in the case of United States v. A&P
Trucking Co.39 There, two partnerships were charged with violations of certain
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. The district court had found that the
partnerships as entities could not be charged with violating the statutes. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed, looking at the definition of “person” found in 1 U.S.C. § 1: “in
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise .
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. . the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock corporations as well as individuals”
(emphasis added). The Court looked at Congressional intent in the statute, finding that
the intent to bar the activity in question was not limited by the form of the organization.40
Many carriers are organized as partnerships and the form of the organization should not
trump the intent of the statute.41
While under common law, the Court noted, partnerships could not be charged
with a crime, Congress had the power to change this rule. A business cannot be allowed
to commit a crime simply because of its form of organization or because the partners “do
not personally participate in the infraction.”42 The Court made clear that charging the
partnership should not punish those partners and others that were not involved in the
criminal act: “The corollary is, of course, that the conviction of a partnership cannot be
used to punish the individual partners, who might be completely free of personal guilt.
As in the case of corporations, the conviction of the entity can lead only to a fine levied
on the firm’s assets.”43
Commentators have noted that prosecutions of partnerships, particularly
professional partnerships such as law and accounting firms, are rare; prosecutors
generally prefer to go after the individual partners involved in the criminal activity.44
Certain similarities exist in cases in which corporations and partnerships are held
criminally liable. Typically these similarities are: partners and associates are involved,
acting within the scope of their authority; the entity benefited from the violations, and
there is a perceived need to prosecute the entire entity so that others will abide by the
law.45
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In Andersen’s case, these factors were present. David Duncan, the lead Enron
partner, plead guilty to obstructing justice. Other partners, although not all of them, were
involved. All the partners, however, share in the profits of the firm, and Enron was one
of Andersen’s biggest and most profitable clients, bringing in about $57 million annually
in fees.46 Further, as discussed in more detail below, there was a perceived need on
behalf of the administration to punish Andersen as major corporate scandals erupted.
The Supreme Court’s concerns about the prosecution of innocent partners and
employees in A&P Trucking went unheeded in the Andersen case. Many who were not
involved were harmed by the prosecution of Andersen. Many non-partners lost their
jobs. Retired Andersen partners lost their savings as their interests in the firm became
worthless, much as Enron shareholders and employees found their savings decimated by
the stock’s rapid decline. The destruction of one business caused the government to
destroy another, putting more people out of work in a tough economy and wiping out the
retirements of more.
Prosecutorial Discretion
The question of whether to prosecute an entire organization, then, is one of
prosecutorial discretion dependent on the particular facts of the case. The Justice
Department could choose to prosecute the individuals directly involved with or without
prosecuting the entire partnership. Andersen knew this and, as discussed above, there
was much legal wrangling, public and private, prior to the indictment. Many factors here,
some appropriate, some questionable, likely contributed to the decision to prosecute the
entire firm.
Publicly, the Justice Department stated two reasons to warrant the prosecution of
the entire firm rather than just the individuals involved. First, it said, the shredding of the
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documents warranted the rare action of indicting the entire firm, even as the lead Enron
partner had already plead guilty. The government never charged Andersen with any
wrongdoing regarding the audits themselves.47
Second, at the time of the Enron debacle, Andersen as a firm had already been in
trouble with authorities. The Waste Management case resulted in a court injunction
against the firm. The firm was barred from future misdeeds. No doubt the firm's
involvement with Waste Management and other prior SEC cases contributed to the
prosecutor's sense that Andersen was a firm that needed to be reprimanded and reformed.
Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff reportedly was unmoved by notions that an
indictment would destroy Andersen, describing the firm as a “recidivist” that deserved
the harshest punishment.48 This image of Andersen as a “recidivist” played a major role
in the subsequent trial. The trial court allowed admission of evidence of Andersen’s prior
bad acts with regards to its work on the Sunbeam and Waste Management accounts, and
the Fifth Circuit upheld this admission.49
Other unnamed factors also likely contributed to the Justice Department’s
decision to prosecute the entire firm rather than just the individual wrongdoers. Among
these are intense media coverage, the magnitude of the Enron case, and political
considerations throughout the Bush administration and the Justice Department.
Media Coverage
Today, the news media is global and far-reaching. The stock market boom of the
1990’s promoted wide coverage of business and corporate dealings, and CEO’s became
famous. When the bubble burst, many people lost considerable sums of money, but
continued to follow the market and corporate news, largely as their retirement accounts
and mutual funds were tied up in the stock market. When Enron collapsed amidst a slew
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of large corporate scandals, the news media were quick to cover the story. Andersen, as
the corporation’s auditor, was heavily scrutinized.
The Magnitude of the Enron Case
Federal prosecutors clearly considered the magnitude of the Enron debacle. Enron
was the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history.50 While negotiating with Andersen,
Chertoff called the situation “the worst case of corporate obstruction I have ever seen.”51
Many found their retirement savings decimated. Today the word “Enron” has become
synonymous with corporate greed and scandal. “Andersen,” through its relationship with
Enron, has become synonymous for accounting improprieties and failure to protect
shareholders through corporate audits.
Political Considerations
Politics, too, likely played a role. The fall of Enron came on the heels of the
September 11 attacks, in which the government looked ineffective in protecting the
populace. It also emerged from Texas, where the new President had been governor.
Ken Lay, Enron's CEO, was close friends with the Bush family and his company had
close affiliations with Halliburton, an energy company Vice President Cheney formerly
headed.52 Prior to September 11 and the collapse of Enron, President Bush's domestic
policy floundered. Enron and Andersen both were major contributors to the Bush
campaign.53 All these factors forced the Justice Department and the Bush administration
to prosecute Andersen sternly to appear effective against corporate greed.
Political considerations influenced not only the top of the administration. At the
Justice Department, Michael Chertoff was the prosecutor who chose to indict Andersen.
Such a high-profile case garnered political notice. He is currently secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security. The Supreme Court’s decision is unlikely to affect
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Chertoff in his current career. His decision to prosecute the entire firm and his
succession in gaining a conviction in the district court likely contributed to the
advancement of his career. The subsequent overturning of the conviction is unlikely to
affect his current placement.
As of this writing, Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling's trials are slated for January 2006,
almost five years after Enron's collapse and four years after Andersen's. Clearly, the probusiness administration wanted to prosecute someone in the wake of the Enron disaster to
look effective against illegal corporate greed and fraud. While prosecutions of the
higher-ups in Enron were inevitable, the administration instead chose to pursue its
accountants first. An argument can be made that the case against the top Enron
executives is tougher and takes longer to put together. The shredding, on the other hand,
was an easily identifiable impropriety.
Nonetheless, any questionable accounting methods began at Enron. Andersen
may have signed off on the improper accounting, persuaded to do so by the large fees
paid by Enron and its desire to placate a profitable client. Significantly, Andersen has
never been charged with impropriety regarding its audit of Enron; its sole criminal charge
amounted to destroying documents related to the account.54
The individuals who gained the most from the fraudulent scheme were the top
Enron executives, not the outside accountants and auditors. Prosecuting Andersen
garnered front-page headlines, making the Justice Department look as though it were
doing something about corporate greed and malfeasance. Andersen may be to blame, but
its crime was merely that of aiding and abetting, not the actual theft.
SEC Rule 102(e)
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The indictment opened up the possibility of conviction. Conviction would be
devastating enough, but in this case it was exacerbated by the presence of SEC Rule
102(e). Under this rule, certain people can be barred from practice before the SEC; thus,
they cannot represent publicly held companies. At the time of the indictment, Andersen
served as auditor for 20 percent of the country's publicly held companies.55 Among those
the SEC can bar are “any person who has been convicted of a felony.”56 The disbarment
or suspension is “deemed to have occurred when the disbarring, suspending, revoking or
convicting agency or tribunal enters its judgment or order.”57 In other words, an
indictment should be insufficient to bar a firm from representing SEC clients.
The SEC also provides waivers allowing those who might be barred from
practicing with SEC approval. In Andersen’s case, during settlement negotiations, the
SEC gave no assurances that Andersen would receive a waiver if it were convicted. The
SEC did promulgate regulations designed to forestall panic should Andersen collapse.
These regulations allowed SEC registrants to continue to use previous Andersen reports
without certain technical requirements, such as a signature, since the firm was unlikely to
continue existence.58 Thus, the SEC assumed Andersen would collapse even before its
conviction. This pessimism contributed to a sense of Andersen's demise as a foregone
conclusion and furthered the decline of the firm and the defection of major clients.
Reputation and Timing
At one time, Andersen was the most venerated accounting firm. Over the years,
however, a series of scandals and poor judgments led the firm to lose much of its
reputation. Given this history, Andersen knew an indictment would be problematic, if
not devastating. Hence, as discussed above, it tried in vain to negotiate deals with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Justice Department to avoid it.

13

Andersen knew an indictment would be extremely troublesome to the firm in an industry
where integrity and honest dealing are considered sacrosanct.
Prosecutors knew this. They also knew something of the accounting industry.
The first criminal charge ever leveled against a major accounting firm came at the height
of the season when publicly traded companies ask shareholders to approve their choice of
auditor.59 It is safe to assume that the management of no company wanted to go to its
shareholders to approve an indicted accounting firm. Thus, even though the firm had yet
to be convicted and this country's criminal laws are premised on the notion of innocent
until proven guilty, the indictment was sufficient to make the clients leave. They left in
droves, each day the departure of a major client or two would be headline news. These
defections snowballed; as more companies left, other companies grew less confident in
Andersen and left themselves.
While the defections were highly visible, Andersen could not actively recruit new
clients to replace its losses at the time. No company would want to move from another
major firm to Andersen. Further, the U.S. Government banned Andersen from bidding
on federal contracts.60 Andersen was losing clients and could not make up the losses.
Conclusion
Many would like to call the Enron case unique. However, cases like Worldcom
and Global Crossing indicate wide-scale corporate fraud is not. Further, the case of
Andersen is not a unique one. In a study, Theodore Eisenberg and Jonathan Macey show
that Andersen was not a unique case among large accounting firms.61 Their study shows
that Andersen's performance with regard to financial statements was not statistically
different from the other large accounting firms.
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The Sarbones-Oxley Act, passed in the wake of the Enron/Andersen scandal, is
designed to address some of these problems. However, problems of auditor
independence are still relevant. The ramifications of the Andersen case are highlighted
again by current events. The Justice Department recently contemplated criminal charges
against one of the remaining large accounting firms, KPMG, related to its use of illegal
tax shelters.62 Before KPMG settled and many of the individuals involved were
arrested,63 the SEC contemplated whether to grant a waiver should KPMG be convicted
and promulgating rules to assure large companies if KPMG collapses.64 If KPMG or
another major accounting firm were to collapse as Andersen did, the further consolidation
and concentration of the large accounting firms into three is likely to spur other problems.
As the Andersen and KPMG cases show, prosecutorial discretion is a major factor
these days in determining whether a firm can survive. While a firm may have acted
improperly, it can negotiate with prosecutors, paying remuneration or fines rather than
going through the publicity and expense of trial. An indictment is devastating for a firm
that relies on a strong public image of honesty and integrity. Prosecutors know this, and
can exploit their power over firms. An indictment takes only a little evidence to get, but
can have an enormous impact.
As the decision to prosecute KPMG is considered, the question of the value of
prosecuting a company must be considered. As one commentator has pointed out, a
prosecution and conviction of KPMG would not harm it because “it has no soul” and the
costs would be paid by partners, employees and customers.65 Punishing a corporation
persecutes individuals who were not involved in the wrongdoing. There is rarely
opposition to corporate punishment because a corporation is seen as a soulless entity and
without individual suffering since the costs are spread among many.66
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Writing in the New York Times, Stanford law professor and former commissioner
of the SEC Joseph Grundfest comments persuasively that “[b]ecause the only sure
defense is not to attract the prosecutor’s attention in the first instance, the rise of
prosecutorial power may be society’s strongest tool to enforce corporate integrity.”67
Grundfest points out that many large corporations and partnerships could be destroyed
simply by the government issuing criminal charges against them. Any firm or
organization that requires a strong public reputation is at risk as is any organization that
does business with the federal government. The power of the government over these
firms, demonstrated by its destruction of Andersen, is potentially crippling.
There are other ramifications from Grundfest’s statement. If the goal is to avoid
prosecutorial attention, wrongdoers may just hide their misdeeds in more complex
transactions and cover-ups. Alternatively, wrongdoers may work even harder to
ingratiate themselves into the political system so that prosecutors feel pressure from
higher-ups and politicians to look the other way.
Grundfest argues that, in the Andersen trial, “prosecutors persuaded the trial judge
to interpret the law in a way that eviscerated the government's need to prove Andersen's
criminal intent.”68 This is symptomatic of the whole system at play. The prosecutors did
not have to prove their case. They punished Andersen prior to a guilty verdict. They put
thousands of people who had never dealt with Enron out of work. Enron wiped out
numerous 401(k)'s; the government wiped out the investments of retired Andersen
partners who had invested in the firm over many years.
Grundfest questions whether stronger safeguards against prosecutors who can
“exercise their life or death power over corporations”69 can even be put in place, whether
they come from Congress, the Justice Department, the SEC or the press. This leads to a
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vicious cycle of watchdogs watching watchdogs. If prosecutors are conscientious and
make balanced informed decisions about whether to prosecute cases, the problem
manages itself. When, however, prosecutors are persuaded by politics, personal
ambition, and the spotlight of a high profile case, even innocent organizations are in
jeopardy.
The Andersen case highlights a contemporary problem in American law. As
media coverage is instantaneous and omnipresent, the ramifications of the issuance of an
indictment can be damning, despite the possibility of acquittal or reversal of a conviction.
Prosecutors need not be overreaching, overzealous or politically motivated to destroy a
major partnership or corporation and put thousands out of work. Prosecutors must be
careful and discriminating in wielding the awesome power of their ability to seek and
obtain indictments that are potentially lethal.
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